Apple's App Store commission and the Epic Games antitrust saga aftermath
Apple just got dinged for contempt, then partially un-dinged, but don’t let the legal gymnastics distract you: their 'reasonable' App Store commissions are still squeezing developers dry, proving that compliance can be an illusion. The story of Apple’s App Store commissions, especially in the wake of the Epic Games antitrust saga, is a masterclass in strategic reinterpretation of legal mandates. Rather than fostering genuine competition or offering true developer choice, Apple consistently engineers its compliance to maintain control and revenue, creating an illusion of openness while effectively negating its spirit.
The legal saga began in 2021 when a court injunction, a direct outcome of the Epic Games lawsuit, mandated that Apple allow developers to include links to alternative payment methods outside the App Store. For many, this was a landmark victory, signaling a crack in the "walled garden." Developers anticipated more flexibility and potentially lower transaction costs. Apple’s response, however, was anything but a concession.
The company promptly introduced a controversial 27% commission on purchases made via these external links—a move that Epic Games CEO Tim Sweeney famously decried as "junk fees." This wasn't just corporate bluster. Developers quickly realized that when this 27% "Link Tax" was combined with external payment processing fees, the total cost could easily surpass Apple's standard 30% in-app commission. The supposed "choice" became a financial trap, making off-platform payments economically unviable for many.
This deliberate subversion of the injunction's intent did not go unnoticed. In April 2025, U.S. District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers found Apple in contempt, even referring the company to federal prosecutors for possible criminal contempt. It was a significant rebuke, underscoring the court’s exasperation with Apple’s efforts to circumvent the spirit of the ruling.
However, the legal dance continued. In December 2025, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals largely upheld the contempt finding and the original injunction. Critically, though, the appeals court modified the ruling, permitting Apple to claim a "reasonable commission" on off-platform transactions. The court did acknowledge that Apple's previous 27% fee had a "prohibitive effect" on developers, implicitly suggesting it was far from reasonable. This opened a new front in the battle: defining what "reasonable" actually means, a question still largely unanswered and laden with implications for developers. [Source: MacRumors, Neonpay]
Across the Atlantic, Apple's compliance with the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) has followed a similar pattern. While seemingly offering new terms for external payments, Apple introduced "Store Services" fees of 5% or 13% on external purchases, alongside a "Core Technology Fee" for high-volume apps. Critics argue these terms still undermine the DMA’s goals of user choice and contestability, maintaining Apple’s chokehold on the market. In fact, an internal Apple study from November 2025 even suggested that commission savings resulting from the DMA had not led to price decreases for customers, primarily benefiting developers outside the EU. [Source: Apple DMA Study]
The pattern is clear: Apple’s apparent compliance is often a strategic reinterpretation, a legalistic maneuver designed to protect its revenue streams and control over its ecosystem. The illusion of choice for developers and consumers remains just that—an illusion. Until courts or regulators provide clearer, more forcefully enforced definitions of "reasonable" and "open," Apple appears content to dance on the edge of compliance, ensuring its App Store continues to be less of a marketplace and more of a toll road.
Sources
- https://www.macrumors.com/2025/12/11/apple-app-store-fees-external-payment-links/
- https://www.neonpay.com/blog/the-latest-epic-v.-apple-appeal-ruling-december-2025-what-changed-for-game-developers
- https://developer.apple.com/download/files/DMA-Study-Nov-2025.pdf